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Abstract
This paper presents a model of media competition with free entry when
media platforms are nanced both from advertising receipts and customers
subscriptions. We establish a relationship between the equilibrium levels
of prices, advertising and entry, the welfare maximizing levels, and the ad-
vertising technology. Under constant or increasing returns to scale in the
audience size, we nd an excessive level of entry and an insu¢ cient level
of advertising. We then extend the analysis along several dimensions. The
relation between advertising receipts and subscription receipts depends on
whether media platforms act as quantity setters or price setters in the mar-
ket for advertising, leading to higher subscription prices in the latter case. We
then compare pay media with free media, showing in particular that when
consumers dislike advertising, imposing a non-negativity constraint on the
subscription price raises prots and entry, reduces consumerssurplus and
reduces advertising. We also discuss the role of endogenous content quality
when prices are bound by a non-negativity constraint, showing that results
are intermediate between the pay and the free media model.
Keywords: media, advertising, free entry, two-sided markets.
JEL codes: L13, L82.
1 Introduction
In many media industries, rms receive revenues from two sources: advertis-
ing and sales. For example, consumers of newspapers, magazines, cable TV,
coded broadcast TV, etc. have to pay to read articles or to view programs
that include ads. In these activities, services and ads increase the total rev-
enue of the media owner but they can be hardly increased simultaneously
because of scarce space on the supply side and of advertisement disutility on
the demand side. In other media industries where it is too costly to exclude
consumers, for example websites or free broadcasted TV, advertising is the
only revenue. This paper analyses how this two-sided nancing inuences
quantity and price competition as well as conditions of entry and exit.1
How many independent rms can be active in the media industry is a very
actual problem, as it can be seen from the press industry for instance.2 Recent
innovations, such as digitalization or Internet, have considerably reduced the
limitation on transmission channels, providing new opportunities for entry.
New media, new business models, and media convergence have drastically
changed the media market conditions. In a context where the number of
media rms that can be distributed increases, socially excessive entry may
become a real concern. Our paper aims at providing some light on the on-
going process by discussing the role of advertising from a two-sided market
perspective.
Digital technologies have also deeply changed both the way information
is transmitted and the way a specic audience can be targeted. The model
we use in this paper takes account of this technological advance by assuming
that returns from advertising for announcers and the disutility of advertising
for households are not necessarily linear functions of the number of announce-
ments. With a linear advertising technology, the revenues from advertising
are competed away through lower subscription prices and equilibrium prof-
its are the same as in a model with no advertising. This prot equivalence
breaks when the advertising technology is not linear: prots are higher and
there is more entry if the advertising revenue per subscriber decreases with
the audience. We then analyze the implications for entry and e¢ ciency, and
extend the analysis to various relevant contexts, incorporating price setting
in the advertising market, free media and endogenous content.
1See Jullien (2005) for an introduction to two-sided markets. For more detailed analysis,
see Caillaud-Jullien (2001, 2003), Rochet-Tirole (2003), Armstrong (2006).
2See section 7 in Anderson and Gabszewicz (2005).
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The literature on nancing of media from two sides includes papers by
Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2001a,b) and Dukes and Gal-Or (2003)
who analyze the impact of advertising on the level of di¤erentiation.3 They
nd that advertising reduces di¤erentiation between media platforms. More
recently, Peitz and Valletti (2004) compare both the advertising intensity and
the level of di¤erentiation when media platforms o¤er free services and when
the subscription price is positive. Our model does not allow for endogenous
di¤erentiation apart from the impact of entry, but we also conclude that free
services are associated with larger advertising levels when customers dislike
advertising. The analysis of Anderson and Coate (2005) focuses on welfare
issues. They show that equilibrium advertising levels can be above or below
socially optimal levels and that media platforms can provide too many or
too few programs. Armstrong (2006) presents the comparison between an
advertising quantity game and an advertising price game in the Hotelling
model. His results are akin to ours for a xed number of rms.
Most of these models do not endogenize the number of active media rms
(or only from monopoly to duopoly). Exceptions are Choi (2006) who ana-
lyzes the case of free media with constant returns to scale in the advertising
technology, and Seabright and Weeds (2005) for the case without advertising.
Our analysis extends these works in several directions, including pay media,
price competition and returns to audience scale for advertising, leading to
new and key insights on protability, entry and welfare, and also pointing to
the limits of assuming linearity of the advertising technology.
To analyze the e¤ects of advertising on pricing and entry strategies, we
consider the Salop-Vickrey model of horizontal di¤erentiation. In a rst
stage, the media platforms must decide whether to enter the market or not;
if they enter, they incur a xed entry cost. In a second stage, media platforms
decide how much space will be sold to advertisers and compete in subscrip-
tion prices to attract consumers. In the benchmark case where advertising
exhibits constant returns to scale in the audience size and the unit value of
an ad is just a xed value per customer, the level of entry is the same as
without advertising and consumers are better o¤ due to lower subscription
prices. Welfare analysis indicates that entry is excessive and that the level
of advertising is insu¢ cient. The level of entry is smaller but we obtain the
same qualitative welfare results when a larger audience implies a larger unit
3See also Hackner and Nyberg (2000), Nilssen and Sorgard (2000), Ferrando, Gab-
szewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2004).
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value per customer of an ad. In the opposite case where increasing the audi-
ence decreases the unit value per customer of an ad, the e¤ect on rmsprot
and consumerssurplus is directly linked to this ad unit value. Compared to
a world without advertising, media platforms always benet from advertising
and the level of entry is larger, but welfare results are ambiguous.
On the advertising market, media platforms can either impose an ad-
vertising level (quantity setting) or an advertising price (price setting). In
the quantity setting game, media platforms x advertising volumes and the
advertising price is adjusted by the market at the willingness to pay of the
marginal advertiser. The demand for advertising is thus independent of the
demand for media services. In the price setting game, the demand for adver-
tising depends on both the advertising price and the audience of the media.
An increase in any price has then a complex impact due to the two-sided
nature of the interaction between the customers and the supply of ads. At
equilibrium, the amount of advertising is the same in the two games but the
equilibrium subscription price is di¤erent. In the price setting game, the sub-
scription price is higher when consumers dislike ads (and lower when they
like it). The prot of the media platforms and the level of entry are thus
larger when media platforms set a unit price for advertising than when they
set the advertising quantity, or equivalently when they use a pricing rule that
ties the price of an ad to its true value.
The paper focuses on the interaction between two sources of revenue but
we also consider the case where media rms cannot charge their audience di-
rectly and only get resources through advertising. The comparison between
a pay media model and a free media model is driven by the sign of the sub-
scription price in the pay media model. When consumers dislike advertising,
prots are higher, advertising is less important and consumerssurplus lower
in the free media model if the subscription price is negative. In particular im-
posing a non-negativity constraint on subscription prices can only stimulate
entry.
We then consider additional content provision as an alternative to a nega-
tive equilibrium subscription price, by assuming that subscription prices are
non-negative but consumersperceived quality can be raised at a positive
cost. The introduction of quality in a media context has been developed re-
cently and independently by Seabright and Weeds (2005), who derive in par-
ticular the free entry equilibrium with endogenous quality in the case where
there is no advertising, and by Armstrong and Weeds (2005) in a duopoly
model with advertising showing that quality is higher in a pay media context
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than in a free media one. The focus of these papers is di¤erent from ours as
quality is analyzed as an additional instrument for media platforms, while
we use it only when the subscription price vanishes. Due to a higher cost of
raising the audience with content improvement, we obtain less advertising in
a free media model with quality investment than in a model with a negative
subscription price.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the hypotheses
and notations of the model. In section 3, we analyze the long run equilib-
rium of an industry with advertising resources when media rms choose the
quantity of advertising space. Section 4 is devoted to alternative modes of
competition between platforms, in particular the case where media platforms
set the unit price of advertising, the case where media are supplied for free
and the case where content is endogenous. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model setting
We consider an oligopoly with n media rms (or platforms) supplying cus-
tomers uniformly distributed along a circle of length 1. Platform i sells its
services (news, movies, etc.) at at price pi and receives additional revenues
from the broadcasting of advertisements ai. When the customer located at
point x subscribes to platform i located at xi, his net utility is
u(x;xi; ai)  pi = u  tjx  xij    (ai)  pi (1)
where t is the unit cost of remoteness, u is the willingness to pay for the media
services and (:) is the disutility from ads. We allow disutility (the "nuisance
e¤ect" in Anderson and Coate (2005)) to have a U shape with respect to the
number of ads ai. A small amount of ads may thus raise the willingness to
pay4 but beyond some point the impact becomes negative. More precisely,
the function  (a) is assumed to be convex, with (0) = 0 and 0(a) tends to
+1 when a goes to innity.
From standard arguments of the Vickrey-Salops model5, when the n
platforms are evenly distributed on the circle and (n 1) charge price pn and
4Indeed, some customers enjoy some types of ads. It is the case for magazines special-
ized in fashion or cars as well as for some specic events: the Super Bowl is a showcase
for television commercials, and more than a quarter of viewers tune in just to watch the
ads(The Economist, April 2nd 2005, A survey of consumer power, p.3).
5See for example Tirole (1988) chapter 7.
4
advertise quantity an, one can easily derive from (1) the demand for services
to rm i:
qi =
1
n
+
(an)  (ai) + pn   pi
t
: (2)
The operating prot of platform i is then
i = qi(pi   c) + r(qi; ai); (3)
where c is the unit operating cost and r(:; :) is the revenue from ads.
Advertisers are producers of goods and services who post ads on the
media support with the objective to attract buyers. They can post one ad
per platform. The relationship between media customers and advertisers is
synthesized by the inverse demand s(qi; ai) which is the willingness to pay
for one advertising message aimed at reaching the qi customers of the media.
It is increasing with the audience qi and decreasing with the advertising
volume ai. The direct demand function for advertising spots is denoted by
ai = A(si; qi).
Let us dene
v(qi; ai)  s(qi; ai)
qi
the willingness to pay for an ad per customer at platform i. Dene also
'(qi; ai)  v(qi; ai)ai
the advertising revenue per customer of i. The total revenue from advertise-
ment is then
r(qi; ai) = qi'(qi; ai) = s(qi; ai)ai
that is assumed to be concave in ai: We also assume that for q  1, vq has a
constant sign and jvqj and jvqqj are uniformly bounded and small enough (see
the appendix for details). In particular r(:; :) is increasing with qi: Moreover,
we assume that 'a(qi; 0) = v(qi; 0) > 
0 (0) and 'aa < 0; which will ensure
that the advertising expenditure is strictly positive.
We do not provide a detailed analysis of how the producers decide to
advertise in order to inform/persuade the customers to buy their goods and
services but here is a hint on how the advertising demand function can be
generated. There is a continuum of advertisers indexed by  who want to
advertise their products, where  is uniformly distributed on [0; 1]: Each of
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them may post one ad. The ad of advertiser  reaches the q customers of
the media, which generates a net value qv(q; ) to advertiser . The function
v(q; ) is an index of the average e¢ ciency of advertising, decreasing with .
It depends on the characteristics of the media and on the geographical and
sociological dispersion of the households. At unit price s; advertiser  will
post an ad i¤ qv(q; )  s. Therefore the marginal advertiser is ^ such that
qv(q; ^) = s, and the total demand for posting ads to one platform is dened
as a =
R ^
0
d. Thus the indirect demand function for advertising is dened
by s(q; a) = qv(q; a):
Depending on the characteristics of the media, v(q; a) can have di¤erent
forms. In the benchmark case, v(q; a) is a constant in q. Since the willingness
to pay for the product is the same among consumers, manufacturer  is
willing to pay up to qv(q; a) = qv(0; a) to post an ad received by q potential
clients.
If there are some increasing returns from the audience size, we have
vq(q; a) > 0: This is the case for instance when potential customers be-
long to a sub-group within the set of households, and risk averse advertisers
benet from better predictability with a large audience.6 By contrast, when
vq(q; a) < 0, there are decreasing returns in advertising, say because poten-
tial buyers are concentrated and well identied and an increase in the size of
the audience of the media brings less targeted customers.
In the next section, we analyze a game with the following timing: plat-
forms simultaneously set the price pi for the service they propose to customers
and the level ai of advertising. As an example, one may think of a plat-
form that has prespecied space for advertising, or a magazine with a xed
number of pages of advertising. As noted by Peitz and Valletti (2005), this
may also be viewed as the result of advertising prices being contingent on
the audience of medias.
6Consider a risk averse advertiser and two consumers. Only one consumer is a potential
client who generates a payo¤  = 1 if she see the ads, but she is not identied. The other
consumer generates nothing. When q = 1, the ad generates a sale with probability 1=2
and by risk aversion the willingness to pay is v (1; 1) < 12 : When q = 2, an ad generates 1
for sure and the willingness to pay per consumer is v (2; 1) = 12 > v (1; 1) : More generally
if there are X potential consumers within a total population N; the return from one ad
on a sample of size qN; q < 1, randomly selected follows an hypergeometric distrisbution
with mean qX and a variance q (1  q) X(N X)N 1 that increases at a lower rate than q and
decreases for q > 1=2:
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We assume for the rest of the paper that the market is covered, so that
a symmetric equilibrium obtains when the mass of customer on each site
is qn =
1
n
; while the equilibrium price is pn and the level of advertising is
an: For the sake of conciseness, we present only the rst order conditions
of the media platformsoptimal strategies. Second order and global exis-
tence conditions are in Appendix A. Existence requires that the media be
di¤erentiated enough, which translates into the following assumption:
Assumption For all q and a(q) = argmaxa('(q; a)   (a)); the following
condition holds:
t  2'q + q'qq   q
('aq)
2
'aa   00
: (4)
3 Competing media
We begin with the calculation of the equilibrium prices xed by platforms
for the service they provide and the equilibrium quantities of ads they accept
to publish with an emphasis on the role of returns to scale in the advertising
technology. We then address the determination of long run equilibrium and
we compare the results with the socially optimal levels.
3.1 Equilibrium price and advertising levels
The rst order conditions for the maximization of prot (3) are evaluated
at pi = pn and ai = an to dene the equilibrium level of price and the
equilibrium level of advertising. This writes as
@q
@p

(pn   c) + qn +

@q
@p

rq(qn; an) = 0;
@q
@a

(pn   c) + ra(qn; an) +

@q
@a

rq(qn; an) = 0:
The equilibrium levels then verify
pn = c+
t
n
  rq( 1
n
; an); (5)
and
'a(
1
n
; an) = 
0(an): (6)
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Increasing the amount of advertising a for a given clientele q generates
a marginal revenue per customer 'a and requires to reduce the subscription
price by 0 so as to maintain the clientele. The marginal revenue per customer
must thus be equal to the marginal disutility of advertising per customer.
Notice that the platform may set an advertising level that would not
be perceived as a nuisance by consumers, even at the margin, i.e. such
that 0 (a) < 0. Whenever the revenue per customer decreases with total
advertising at the level that maximizes the utility of customers, the platform
chooses to restrict advertising below this level.
Since r is increasing with q, the equilibrium price is below c + t
n
: The
subscription equilibrium price is lowered by an audience e¤ect of advertising.
As stated in Proposition 1, the price of services does not necessarily cover
the marginal cost.
Proposition 1 When the number of sites becomes large, the subscription
price is below marginal cost.
Proof. It is su¢ cient to observe that rq( 1n ; a

n) converges to '(0; a

1) > 0
when the number of platforms becomes large.
Under constant return in the advertising technology, the equilibrium he-
donic price pn + (a

n) is the same as in a Salop-Vickrey model with cost
c  '(an) + (an).7 The possibility of generating revenue on the advertising
market leads the media platform to maximize the joint surplus of the pair
platform-client, which entails a reduction in price. Overall this operation is
neutral for the platforms and benecial to consumers. The impact of ad-
vertising nancing is then independent of the number of platforms, as each
platform chooses the advertising level a and reduces its price by ' (a) :
When returns are not constant, the advertising level depends on the num-
ber of platforms. A standard comparative static analysis gives the following
result:
Proposition 2 The level of advertising decreases, increases, or does not
change with the number of platforms as 'aq > 0; 'aq < 0 or 'aq = 0 re-
spectively.
7See Armstrong and Vickers (2001).
8
Proof. We have an = a
 (1=n) : Totally di¤erentiating condition (6)
and using second order conditions show that the sign of da
(q)
dq
is the sign
of 'aq: The results then follows from the fact that increasing n reduces the
audience per site.
Indeed what matters for the level of advertising is the marginal revenue
per customer which may decrease or increase with the size of the audience.
3.2 Advertising technology and entry
If we insert condition (5) into (1), the di¤erence between the equilibrium
level u(n; x)  pn of net utility for the consumer located at x when there are
n active platforms nanced by ads and the net utility of the same viewer
absent advertising is given by
u(n; x)  pn   (u  c  tjx  xij   t
n
) = rq(
1
n
; an)   (an) :
Similarly, the di¤erence between the equilibrium level of (variable) prot of
the individual media platform nanced by advertising and the prot of the
same media platform without ads is given by (using r   qrq =  q'q)
(n)  t
n2
=  'q(
1
n
; an)
n2
: (7)
The following proposition describes how the advertising technology de-
termines the impact of ads on platformsprots and consumerssurplus.
Proposition 3 Compared with the no-advertising case, for a xed number
of platforms :
i) under constant returns to scale in the audience ('q = 0), platforms
prots are not a¤ected by advertising and the consumerssurplus is higher;
ii) under increasing returns to scale ('q > 0); platformsprots are lower
and the consumerssurplus is higher than without advertising.
iii) under decreasing returns to scale ('q < 0); platforms prots are
higher; the consumers surplus is higher when n is large enough, or when'q is small enough, or when (an) < 0:
Proof. The results are immediate for prots. The change in consumer
surplus has the sign of rq , which is clearly positive if  < 0: Now suppose
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that  > 0: Then, using r = q'; and ' = av(q; a) and since 
0
n
= ra, we have
rq    = rq   
0
ra
q
= '

1  
a0

+ q'q  

0
ava:
Given that (an) is positive and (:) is convex, 1 >

a0 > 0 and va < 0:
Therefore the e¤ect of advertising is positive when returns to scale in the
audience are constant or increasing ('q  0). When returns to scale are
decreasing, consumers benet from advertising only when q'q is close to 0.
When n is large, note that q'q converges to zero so that the e¤ect is positive.
The e¤ect of advertising on platformsprot crucially depends on the
advertising technology. Advertising increases the revenue of the platform
but it also has a negative impact on the subscription price. The total e¤ect
is given by the sign of 'q. When advertising exhibits constant returns to
scale in the audience, the net e¤ect is null.
For customers, the e¤ect of advertising depends on the sign of (rq   ).
If the "price e¤ect" rq is higher than the "nuisance e¤ect" ; customers are
better o¤ when media can provide advertising. Notice that rq    is the
derivative with respect to q of maxa (r(q; a)   (a) q) ; which is the revenue
net of the nuisance and thus the total surplus generated by advertising for
the media and its customers. Thus the customers benet from advertising
whenever the maximal surplus that the platform and its clients can derive
from advertising is increasing with q.
Let us now consider the level of entry. In the long run, the equilibrium
number of platforms is given approximately by (n) = k, where k is the
xed cost of entry. Condition (4), which guarantees the existence of the
equilibrium, implies also that the prot is decreasing with respect to n: Thus
there exists a unique equilibrium number of entrants.8 Let n be the level of
entry in the quantity game. From (7), the number of active platforms in the
long run equilibrium is given by
t
n2
  k = 'q(
1
n
; an)
1
n2
: (8)
from which we can assert the following:
8Monotonicity of the equilibrium prot with respect to n is given by @(n)@n < 0, which
imposes that 2t > 2'q(
1
n ; an) +
1
n'qq(
1
n ; an)  1n
'qa(
1
n ;an)
2
'aa(
1
n ;an) 00(an)
:
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Proposition 4 The number of active rms is the same as in a world without
advertising when there are constant returns to scale in the audience. The
level of entry is higher (resp. lower) with advertising than without under
decreasing (resp. increasing) returns to scale in the audience.
Proof. Immediate from Proposition 3.
Thus, assessing the nature of the advertising technology is key to under-
stand the impact of advertising on the market structure. In some cases, this
may result in less entry than with a ban of advertising.
3.3 Welfare
To determine welfare, we assume that there is no informational externality
between consumers related to advertising such as word of mouth. We also
assume that the goods o¤ered by the producers who pay for advertising
are not competing. Following Anderson and Coate (2005), welfare can be
computed as the sum of the consumerssurplus, the advertiserssurplus and
the platformsprot. Social welfare can then be written as follows:
W (n; a) = [u  2n
Z 1
2n
0
txdx   (a)] +
Z a
0
v(
1
n
; )d   nk   c: (9)
The expression in the square bracket represents consumersbenets from
consuming the media services given a number n of media platforms and a
quantity of advertising a. The term
R a
0
v( 1
n
; )d represents manufacturers
benets from advertising. The last two terms are media platformscosts.
The rst order condition with respect to n denes the optimal number of
media platforms no (a) for a given a:
t
4no (a)2
  k = 1
no (a)2
Z a
0
vq(
1
no (a)
; )d (10)
The optimal advertising quantity aon, given a number n of platforms and a
mass 1=n of customers per site is
v(
1
n
; aon) = 
0 (aon) (11)
The optimal level of advertising is such that the willingness to pay for
the marginal advertiser (the marginal social benet of advertising) equals the
marginal disutility of advertising (the marginal social cost).
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A rst relation between the socially optimal levels and the equilibrium
levels is stated in the following lemma. Denote n(a) the solution of equation
(8) for a given value of a:
Lemma 1 Comparing the advertising and entry levels at market equilibrium
and at welfare maximum, we have:
i) aon > a

n for all n.
ii) no(a) < n(a) for all a when vqa  0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The rst part results from the exercise of market power by media plat-
forms on the market for advertising. Instead of equating the increase in
advertising disutility 0(:) with the willingness to pay for an ad per customer
v(:) like in (11), media platforms equate 0(:) and the marginal revenue of
advertising 'a = v + ava > v (see (6)). Thus for a given number of media
platforms, there is too little advertising. The second part is a standard result
of the Salop-Vickrey model. Because of a business stealing e¤ect, for a given
level of advertising, there are too many entrants.
The overall comparison between the free entry equilibrium welfare and
the optimum is delicate, as it involves several e¤ects. The next proposition
characterizes the welfare analysis for the case of constant and increasing
returns to scale in the audience.
Proposition 5 Assume that consumers dislike advertising. When an is non-
decreasing ('qa  0) and vqa  0; there are more entry and less advertising
than at the welfare optimum.
Proof. See Appendix B.
This result of underprovision of advertising, as pointed out by Arm-
strong (2006), comes from the fact that each media platform acts has a
local monopoly in the advertising market.
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4 Alternative modes of competition
In reaction to technological innovations, media business models have been
quite innovating in the recent years. Because new forms of competition
may lead to di¤erent outcomes, we need to understand how our analysis is
a¤ected when the competition between platforms is takes alternative forms
. In what follows, we modify the model along three dimensions that seem
to be the most relevant: the price as a strategic variable on the market for
advertising, free media platforms, and the quality dimension. For the sake of
conciseness we restrict attention in this section to the case where consumers
dislike advertising, as stated below:9
Assumption: The disutility  (a) is increasing with a.
4.1 Price vs: quantity on the advertising market
There are many instances where media platforms can let the amount ai of
advertising adjust to prices without a¤ecting the quality and quantity of the
service they supply. For instance, newspapers or magazines can adjust the
number of pages, websites can adjust their ergonomics. Here we consider what
happens if the platforms choose a subscription price pi and an advertising
price si:The demand for advertising addressed to rm i is then ai = A (si; qi)
and is jointly determined with qi:
Intuitively, the subscription demand is less sensitive to the subscription
price than in the previous case. To understand this e¤ect, suppose that media
platform i increases its subscription price by 1 unit. Absent advertising, this
would reduce the demand for its service by 1
t
: The immediate e¤ect is to
raise the demand of customers to adjacent platforms. As a consequence the
level of advertising at adjacent platforms also increases. But this reduces
the attractiveness of adjacent platforms so that the nal reduction is smaller
than 1
t
: There is thus a feedback e¤ect through the adjustment of advertising
levels.
One di¢ culty is that the demand to platform i now depends on the strate-
gies of all the other platforms. When it changes its subscription price, the
9Alternatively we could assume that platforms always set advertising levels at a point
where the marginal impact on consumers is negative. This seems a reasonable assumption
for the vast majority of media.
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change in the level of advertising at adjacent platforms i + 1 and i   1 af-
fects the demand of media services to the next platforms i + 2 and i   2;
and thereby the level of advertising they face. This in turn a¤ects the next
platforms and so on. Following this reasoning we see that demand for both
services and advertising to all platforms are a¤ected. We refer to this as a
propagation e¤ect along the circle. The next proposition compares the sub-
scription price and the quantity of advertising under price setting with pn
and an determined in the former section under quantity setting.
Proposition 6 When platforms set the price of advertising, for a given
n; the equilibrium level of advertising is an; and there exists 

n > 1 such
that the equilibrium subscription price is pn +
t
n
(n   1) :
Proof. See Appendix B.
Like in the quantity game, the subscription equilibrium price is lowered
by the audience e¤ect of advertising.10 Since consumers dislike ads, because
the volume of advertising at all platforms is endogenous, it is harder to cap-
ture market shares, which mitigates competition. This e¤ect, that appears
through n > 1; tends to raise the equilibrium price and platforms are bet-
ter o¤ in the "price setting game" as compared with the "quantity setting
game". Of course for a given n; consumers are worse o¤, and advertisers
obtain the same surplus.
We show in Crampes et al. (2005) that n is of the order of
p
n: As a
consequence, when n is large, both the media platforms and the consumers
(and of course the advertisers) are better o¤ compared to the no-advertising
case, which was not the case in the quantity game.
The main consequence of the reduction in the level of competitiveness is
that entry is boosted:
Proposition 7 There is more entry when media platforms set the price of
advertising than when they set the volume of advertising.
Proof. The proof is straightforward given that there is a unique number
of entrant in the quantity setting game, and prots are positive for n  n
since n > 1:
10In the case were 0 < 0; the price is smaller than when platforms set advertising
quantity (as n < 1); while for 
0 = 0 it is the same. This generalizes similar results
obtained by Armstrong (2005), for a two-rm model, and thus without the propagation
e¤ect.
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An immediate consequence is that if advertising increases with the audi-
ence, there is also less advertising in the long-run equilibrium when platforms
set the advertising price. In particular:
Corollary 1 When 'qa  0 and vqa  0, the quantity setting model is so-
cially preferable to the price setting model.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Notice that given that 'qa = vq+avqa; the conditions require that vq  0;
which means constant or increasing returns in the advertising technology.11
Under decreasing returns to scale, the choice between the two models is more
di¢ cult. In particular, if entry is excessive, we may obtain too much entry
in the price setting game in comparison to the quantity setting game but
we may obtain an advertising level closer to the socially optimal one in the
former.
4.2 Free media vs: pay media
Media may be distributed for free for two reasons. First, it may be techni-
cally di¢ cult to monitor access to a media, as for instance to free-to-air TV.
Second, the equilibrium subscription price may be negative and it may be
di¢ cult to support negative prices, for instance when the concerned popula-
tion is small and the rest of the population can acquire the good at no cost
and decide not to consume it (with thus no benet to advertisers). Then
the service will be o¤ered for free and nanced through advertising revenue
solely. Typical examples of this are the emergence of free newspapers in
recent years, and the free search engines and website on Internet.
When consumers access freely to media services, results can be derived
by adjusting the rst order condition of the quantity game to the constraint
pn = 0: The equilibrium level of advertising is a^n = argmaxa r(q; a)   cq
where q = 1
n
+ (an) (a)
t
: The rst order condition gives 12
ra(
1
n
; a^n)  
0 (a^n)
t

rq(
1
n
; a^n)  c

= 0: (12)
11If v is separable v(q; a) = g(q)G(a), where G0 < 0; then the conditions are veried
exactly when vq  0.
12A detailed analysis can be found in Choi (2006).
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The trade-o¤ is between the increase in the volume of advertising and the
reduction in the price of advertising induced by the reduction in audience.
The comparison between a^n and the level an of advertising when the platform
has a non zero subscription price is based on the observation that equation
(6) can be rewritten as
ra(
1
n
; an) 
0 (an)
t
(rq(
1
n
; an)  c) =
0 (an)
t
pn: (13)
Lemma 2 Assume that (12) has a unique solution. Then a^n < an (resp.
> an) when p

n < 0 (resp. > 0):
Proof. The LHS of (12) estimated at an has the same sign as p

n. The
Lemma then results from the fact that (12) is decreasing at a^n by the second
order condition:
Thus, given that customers dislike advertising, a pay-media generates less
advertising when equilibrium prices are positive.
Of particular interest is the case where media platforms can charge sub-
scription prices but these prices have to be non-negative. Then the equilib-
rium price is the maximum of zero and pn; and the level of advertising is the
minimum of an and a^n: Imposing a non-negativity constraint on subscription
price can thus only reduce the level of advertising.
The next question is whether platforms benet from imposing positive
subscription prices to consumers and whether consumers are better o¤ or
worse o¤ in the free-media model. We show in Appendix B that the benet
of imposing prices to consumers depends on returns to scale in the advertising
technology.
Proposition 8 Assume that 'aq  0. If pn < 0, free-media prots are larger
than pay-media prots and free-media consumerssurplus is lower than pay-
media surplus.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The case where the equilibrium subscription price is constrained to be
non-negative leads to interesting conclusions. Now the media service is either
free or sold at a positive price. Then prots are either equal to or larger than
prots in the case were prices can be negative. Moreover the advertising level
is unchanged or smaller.
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Corollary 2 Assume that 'aq  0: There is (weakly) more entry and less
advertising if prices are constrained to be non-negative than if prices are not
constrained.
Proof. There is more entry since for given n; prots are equal to or larger
than prots in the unconstrained price regime. From lemma 2, advertising
is min fan; a^ng and it is decreasing in n:
Thus the excessive entry / insu¢ cient advertising result of section 3.3 is
reinforced.
Corollary 3 Assume that 'aq  0 and vqa  0: Then total welfare is lower
when a non-negativity constraint is imposed on prices.
Proof. Immediate from Corollary 2 and Proposition 5.
In the case where media services are constrained to be free, the result
of excessive entry and insu¢ cient advertising is not evident. Indeed Choi
(2006) shows in a model with constant returns in the advertising technology
that entry and advertising can be either excessive or insu¢ cient.
Finally let us point that the analysis of the equilibrium with free access is
similar when platforms set the price of advertising, accounting for the factor
: The new feature is that the transport cost t has to be replaced by nt for the
pay-media case, and ^nt for the free-media case, where the coe¢ cients 

n and
^n are functions of the advertising levels an and a^n. The conclusions are then
similar to those obtained when platforms set the volume of advertising.
4.3 Quality vs: negative price
When rms are constrained to set the service price to zero, they may opt for
alternative competition strategies that would not be protable with exible
prices. One such alternative is to increase the content either in volume or in
quality.13
To examine the issue, let us assume that prices are constrained to be non-
negative, and that investing zi per customer allows a platform to raise the
utility of its customers by an amount zi, where  is a parameter smaller than
13The provision of quality in a broadcasting context is developed in Armstrong and
Weeds (2005) and Seabright and Weeds (2005). They consider quality as a complementary
instrument to subscription prices.
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1. In this case the subscription demand (2) is qi = 1n+
(an) (ai)+pn zn pi+zi
t
;
and the prot (3) becomes (pi   zi   c) qi + r(qi; ai):
If  = 1; we can relabel an equivalent price epi = pi zi that can be positive
or negative. The situation would then be the same as before, interpreting
negative price as quality provision.
Now assume that  < 1: As reducing the price is more protable than
increasing zi; it is immediate that a platform will not include an extra content
if its price is positive. Therefore the equilibrium is the same as before if
pn  0; with zn = 0:
When pn < 0; the equilibrium is obtained at a zero subscription price.
The prot of a platform i choosing a zero subscription price can be dened
as
i = qi(( zi)  c) + r(qi; ai)
where qi =
1
n
+
(an)=  (ai)=+ ( zn)  ( zi)
t=
:
Thus we can treat ( zi) as a subscription price in a game where the
disutility from ads is  (a) = and the transport cost is t=; and platforms
choose a non-negative subscription price ( zi) and the advertising level ai.
Thus when zn > 0, the equilibrium level of adverting is an < a

n that solves:
'a(
1
n
; an) = 
0 (an) =;
and by (5) the level of zi is given by
zn =  

c+
t
n
  rq( 1
n
; an)

:
We thus obtain:
Proposition 9 Suppose that pn < 0 and subscription prices cannot be nega-
tive. Then platforms set pn = 0 and increase content bymax fzn; 0g : Assuming
that (12) has a unique solution, the advertising level is max fan; a^ng :
Proof. The rst part of the proposition is immediate given the remarks
above. Observe that from (13) zn =  [c + tra(
1
n
;an)
0(an)
  rq( 1n ; an)]. We observe
that zn = 0 is obtained at a

n = a^n; and since (12) is decreasing at a^n, we
have that zn > 0 implies a

n > a^n.
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An equilibrium with a zero price and no extra content emerges when
c+ 
t
n
  rq

1
n
; an

 0  c+ t
n
  rq

1
n
; an

;
thus when  is large enough.
The e¤ect of allowing for extra content is thus to restore the role of
negative prices but at the cost of higher disutility for consumers for given
(negative) unit revenue and also less di¤erentiation. Comparing with the pre-
vious cases, this softens the negative impact on advertising of the constraint
on subscription prices. The reason is that the relative cost of preserving the
audience by reducing advertising is smaller than before, as the alternative is
to increase z which is more costly than reducing the price p: The qualita-
tive features of the equilibrium are however the same as before, adjusting for
coe¢ cient :
Notice also that, assuming that 'aq  0, prot is lower at zn > 0 (a
negative price) than at zn = 0 : platforms would be better o¤ without the
possibility to raise content. As a consequence, we can assert the following
proposition:
Proposition 10 Assume that 'aq  0; that subscription prices cannot be
negative and that platforms can improve content. Then there is more en-
try and less advertising than with negative prices, and less entry and more
advertising than with no extra content.
Proof. The same proof as for proposition 8 shows that prot lies between
these two cases, so that entry is intermediate. The result on advertising
follows from corollary 2 and the monotonicity of an:
Thus the possibility to add content leads to an intermediate conclusion
but does not change the nature of the analysis.
5 Conclusion
In contexts where media platforms are nanced both from advertisers and
viewers, the relation between advertising receipts and sales receipts, and the
level of entry and welfare have been shown to depend in a critical way on
the advertising technology. Under reasonable conditions, consumers benet
from advertising due to lower subscription prices. The equilibrium level of
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advertising is suboptimal. As compared with a no-advertising benchmark,
media prots are the same with a linear advertising technology, but they are
higher under decreasing returns in the audience size, and they are lower under
increasing returns. The level of entry is excessive and adjusts in a similar
way, with more entry under decreasing returns in the advertising technology.
We have also seen that whether media platforms set the advertising space
or the advertising price matters, with higher prots and prices and less e¢ -
ciency in the latter case.
Is it socially better to let media platforms set a subscription price? Our
analysis suggests that despite the fact that advertising intensies competition
on the subscription market, unconstrained equilibrium subscription prices
are too high from a consumerswelfare perspective. Thus a constraint that
raises the equilibrium prices is detrimental to consumers, while a move from
positive to zero subscription prices is more likely to benet consumers.
We also emphasized the fact that extra content provision may act as a
substitute to negative subscription prices. The analysis of the model with
endogenous content suggests that the relevant model for the analysis of free
media may intermediate been the pay-media model and the free-media model.
One lesson is that the specic nature of the advertising technology is cru-
cial to understanding the interactions between platforms, the protability of
the market and the pattern of entry. The nature of nonlinearity in advertising
markets should ultimately be traced back to the type of support, the type of
audience, and the advertised products. It would thus be useful to understand
how this varies for di¤erent medias.
Accounting for nonlinearity in the advertising technology appears to be
the most important for issues related to prots. One issue related to prots
that we did not addressed is investment. The importance of future advertis-
ing revenue is clear for instance for the development of the new generation of
mobile telephony (3G). Again the nature of the advertising technology will
be a key determinant of the ability of telecommunication operators to recoup
their investments.
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A Global existence conditions
In the Salop-Vickrey model (a  0); the prot function is concave and rst-
order conditions are su¢ cient for equilibrium. Notice that in the case 'q  0;
the level of advertising is a(0) for any price p set by the media, so that
the model is equivalent to a Salop-Vickrey model with marginal cost c  
'(a(0)); see (5) in the text. Thus rst-order conditions are su¢ cient to
prove existence.
This may not be the case in our general model due to nonlinearity in
advertising resources which changes the gains from increasing the size of the
audience. The su¢ cient conditions for the existence of the equilibrium are
given in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Under condition (4), (pn; a

n) is an equilibrium if and only if a
media platform does not benet from setting (pi; ai) such that qi = 3n ; which
reduces to
t  3n
Z 3
n
1
n
'q(q; a
(q))dq   2'q(
1
n
; an):
Proof. Consider the symmetrical equilibrium with n active media plat-
forms.
Dene
^1(q; t) = (t(
1
n
  q)  c+ pn +  (an))q +max
a
(r(q; a)   (a) q):
Let us now consider the deviation of rm i. Consider rst a deviation leading
to q < 2
n
: Then rm i faces a demand
q =
(an)  (a) + pn   p
t
+
1
n
:
The maximal prot it can obtain while selling q < 2
n
is then given by
^1(q; t): If the function ^1(q; t) is concave, deviations with q < 2n are not
protable. Notice that
^1(q; t) = ^1(q;
t
2
) +
t
2

1
n
  q

q
is concave if ^1(q; t2) is concave.
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At q = 2
n
; there is a discontinuity because if a customer at the distance 1
n
buys from the media, so do all customers at a distance below 3
2n
. Therefore q
jumps at 3
n
: Assume now that a consumer located at a distance x 2 [ j 1
n
; j
n
]
from rm i is indi¤erent between purchasing from rm i and purchasing from
the rm located at the distance j
n
from rm i. We have that
 (an) + p

n + t(
j
n
  x) =  (a) + p+ tx:
Then rm i faces a demand
q =
(an)  (a) + pn   p
t
+
j
n
:
Thus the media platform can sell q 2 [2j 1
n
; 2j
n
] when announcing a price
p = t( j
n
  q) + (an)  (a) + pn. The prot of the deviating rm is given by
^j(q) = (t(
j
n
  q)  c+ pn +  (an))q +max
a
(r(q; a)   (a) q):
This can be rewritten as
^j(q) = ^1(q;
t
2
) +
t
2
(
2j   1
n
  q)q
 ^1(q; t
2
);
where the equality holds at q = 2j 1
n
:
Observe next that ^1( 1n ; t) = ^1(
1
n
; t
2
), so that comparing the equilibrium
prot with the deviation prot when q > 3
n
amounts to comparing ^1( 1n ;
t
2
)
and ^1(q; t2).
Notice that ^1(q; t2) is increasing with q at q =
1
n
:When ^1(q; t2) is concave
^1(q;
t
2
)  ^1( 1n ; t2) for all q  3n if this is true for 3n :
The su¢ cient conditions to guarantee that rm i prefers not to deviate
are thus
i) The function ^1(q; t2) is concave.
ii) ^1( 1n ;
t
2
)  ^1( 3n ; t2):
24
Let us now establish the condition for the concavity of ^1(q; t2). We
evaluate @
2^1(q;
t
2
)
@q2
at a = a (q) where a (q) is dened by 'a(q; a
 (q)) =
0 (a (q)) : Using da
(q)
dq
=   'aq
'aa 00 ; we obtain
@2^1(q;
t
2
)
@q2
=  t+ 2'q + q'qq + q'qa

  'aq
'aa   00

;
which gives condition (4). Moreover the second order condition writes
t+ 2'q(
1
n
; an)  3n

max
a
('(
3
n
; a)   (a)) max
a
('(
1
n
; a)   (a))

which gives the condition in the lemma 3.
Observe that condition (4) is veried under constant returns to scale in
the audience. Else, it requires that the rst and second derivatives of ' with
respect to the audience be close enough to zero. For n large, the su¢ cient
condition reduces to
t  4'q(0; a1); where a1 = lim
n!+1
an > 0 solves 'a(0; a

1) = 
0 (a1) :
B Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Proof of lemma 1.
For a given n, the advertising equilibrium level satises equation
v

1
n
; an

+ anva(
1
n
; an) = 
0 (an) ;
and the socially optimal level is given by
v(
1
n
; aon) = 
0 (aon) :
Since v is decreasing with a, we obtain that an < a
o
n:
Recall that the level of entry in the quantity model n(a) is given by
t
n2
  k = avq( 1
n
; a)
1
n2
:
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The condition dening no(a) is
t
4n2
  k = 1
n2
Z a
0
vq(
1
n
; )d (14)
Observe that when vqa  0; avq( 1n ; a) 
R a
0
vq(
1
n
; ) so that t
n2
 avq( 1n ; a) 1n2 >
t
4n2
  1
n2
R a
0
vq(
1
n
; )d: And thus n(a) > no(a).
Proof of proposition 5.
Assume vqa  0 and 'qa  0. We use lemma 1 to obtain the result. The
sign of dn

da
is given by the sign of  
@(n)
@n
@(n)
@a
which is negative, smaller than
@an
@n
< 0. This implies that for n  n; n(an)  n: Then aon > an implies
that if n  n; then n > n(an) > n(aon) > no(aon): Thus we must have
no < n and as a consequence ao = aono > a

no > a

n.
Proof of proposition 6.
Starting from a symmetric situation pn = p and sn = s, qn = 1n and
an = a; suppose that media platform i = 1 changes its prices p1 and s1.
By symmetry, the consequences of these changes will be the same for media
platform j and n+ 2  j: Using the demand functions for services
qi =
(ai+1) + (ai 1)  2(ai) + pi+1 + pi 1   2pi
2t
+
xi+1   xi 1
2
and the demand function for advertising ai = A(si; qi) we obtain
dq1 =
0(a)da2   dp1   0(a)da1
t
(15)
da1 = Asds1 + Aqdq1
dq2 =
dp1 + 
0(a)da1 + 
0(a)da3   20(a)da2
2t
(16)
da2 = Aqdq2
dqj =
0(a)daj 1 + 
0(a)daj+1   20(a)daj
2t
(17)
daj = Aqdqj for j  3:
26
The case 0 (a) = 0 is immediate, so assume that 0 (a) > 0: Assume rst that
there are n = 2mmedia, then platformm+1 is facingm andm+2 = n+2 m.
In that case, we can write dam+2 = dan m = dam and by (17)
dqm+1 =
20(a)dam   20(a)dam+1
2t
dam+1 = Aqdqm+1
Assume now that there are n = 2m+1 platform, then platformm+1 is facing
m andm+2 = n+2 (m+1). In that case, we have dam+2 = dan m = dam+1
so that by (17)
dqm+1 =
0(a)dam   0(a)dam+1
2t
dam+1 = Aqdqm+1
We can rewrite condition (16) as
  dp1
0(a)
= da1   2

t
0(a)Aq
+ 1

da2 + da3 (18)
and condition (17) as
0 = daj 1   2

t
0(a)Aq
+ 1

daj + daj+1; j = 3; ::;m: (19)
Consider platform m+ 1:
if n = 2m, we know that dam+2 = dam; therefore
t
0(a)Aq
+ 1

dam+1 = dam (20)
if n = 2m+ 1, we know that dam+2 = dam+1; therefore
2

t
0(a)Aq
+ 1

dam+1 = dam + dam+1 (21)
Denote by  (resp. ) the smaller (resp. larger) root of
0 = 1  2

t
0(a)Aq
+ 1

x+ x2:
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Observe that when 0(a) > 0, the equation admits two (positive) roots,
and when 0(a) < 0, the equation admits two (negative) roots only when
0(a) > t
2Aq
. Let
daj = xj
j 1 + yj
j 1 (22)
From (18)
  dp1
0(a)
 da1 = ( 2

t
0(a)Aq
+ 1

x2+x3
2)+( 2

t
0(a)Aq
+ 1

y2+y3
2):
From (19), for j = 3; ::::;m
0 = (xj 1 2

t
0(a)Aq
+ 1

xj+xj+1
2)j 2+(yj 1 2

t
0(a)Aq
+ 1

yj+yj+1
2)j 2
For m+ 1, from (20), (21) and (22)
0 =

xm  

t
0(a)Aq
+ 1

xm+1

m 1
+

ym  

t
0(a)Aq
+ 1

ym+1

m 1 if n = 2m
0 =

xm  

2t
0(a)Aq
+ 1

xm+1

m 1
+

ym  

2t
0(a)Aq
+ 1

ym+1

m 1 if n = 2m+ 1
Set xj = x and yj = y. We obtain
  dp1
0(a)
  da1 =  x  y (23)
0 = x

1 

t
0(a)Aq
+ 1



m 1 + y

1 

t
0(a)Aq
+ 1



m 1 if n = 2m
0 = x

1 

2t
0(a)Aq
+ 1



m 1 + y

1 

2t
0(a)Aq
+ 1



m 1 if n = 2m+ 1
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or
x

1  2
2

m 1 =  y

1  2
2

m 1 if n = 2m (24)
x
 
  2m 1 =  y     2 m 1 if n = 2m+ 1 (25)
From (23) and (24) we can compute x and y corresponding to the case n =
2m. Then injecting those values into (22) for j = 2, we obtain:
da2 =  

dp1
0(a)
+ da1
 

 
m 1   m+1   (m 1   m+1)
(m 1   m+1)   m 1   m+1
!
(26)
if n = 2m
da2 =  

dp1
0(a)
+ da1
 

 
m   m+1   (m   m+1)
(m   m+1)   m   m+1
!
(27)
if n = 2m+ 1
Notice that  = 1 . So we can also write (26) and (27) as
0(a)da2 = (
0(a)da1 + dp1)

n
2
 1 + 
n
2
 1

n
2 + 
n
2
= (0(a)da1 + dp1)
n 1 + 
n + 1
for any n; even or odd.
Using (15), we write the variation of quantity as
dq1 =  
0(a)da1 + dp1
t
;
da1 = Asds1 + Aqdq1
where  = 
n+1
(1 )(1 n 1) > 1:
The rst order conditions for equilibrium are then the same as before but
replacing t by nt where 

n is computed for a = a

n:
Proof of corollary 1.
In both cases, a = an:
dW (n; an)
dn
=
t
4n2
  1
n2
Z an
0
vq(
1
n
; )d   k +

v(
1
n
; an)  0 (an)

dan
dn
 t
4n2
  1
n2
vq(
1
n
; an)  k   anva(
1
n
; an)
dan
dn
if vqa  0:
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But 'qa  0 implies that da

n
dn
 0 and thus anva( 1n ; an)da

n
dn
> 0; and the fact
that  (n) is decreasing and equation 8 imply that t
4n2
  1
n2
vq   k < 0 fro
n > n: Thus dW (n;a

n)
dn
< 0 for n > n: Since the price setting model leads
to n  n; the social welfare is lower than in the quantity model (strictly if
n > n).
Proof of proposition 8.
Both for free-media and pay-media we have:
p  c = t
0(a)
ra(a;
1
n
)  rq(a; 1
n
) =
t
0
1
n
'a   ' 
1
n
'q
and prots
 = r +
1
n
(p  c) = 1
n2

t
0
'a   'q

:
We then have
@
@a

t
0
'a   'q

=

t
0
'aa  
t00
02
'a   'aq

< 0;
when 'aqge0 and since 
0 (a) > 0: Prot is larger under free-media if adver-
tising is lower.
Consumer surplus is a decreasing function of (a) + p (with p = 0 in
the free-media model) and the sign of 0 da
dp
+ 1 indicates whether consumer
surplus increases or decreases when the price increases.
We have from (13) that
da
dp
=
 1
'a + q('aq   t0'aa + t
00
0 'a)
=
 1
'a + q[
@
@a
('q   t0'a)]
Thus
0(a)
da
dp
+ 1 = 1  
0
'a + q[
@
@a
('q   t0'a)]
(28)
Now observe that 'a > 
0 when p > pn and that
@
@a
('q   t0'a) > 0 when
'aq  0 so that 
0
'a+q[
@
@a
('q  t0 'a)]
< 1 if p > pn. We thus have that (a) + p
increases between pn and 0 when p

n < 0.
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